Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is a tort claim of recent origin for intentional conduct that results in extreme emotional distress. Some courts and commentators have substituted mental for emotional, but the tort is the same. Some jurisdictions refer to IIED as the tort of outrage.
[edit] Rationale for classification
IIED was created in tort law to address a problem that would arise when applying the common law form of assault. The common law tort of assault did not allow for liability when the threat was not imminent. A common case would be a future threat of harm that would not constitute common law assault, but would nevertheless cause emotional harm to the recipient. IIED was created to guard against this kind of emotional abuse, thereby allowing a victim of emotional distress to receive compensation in situations where he or she would otherwise be barred from compensation under the common law form.
Originally at common law, a plaintiff could not recover for physical injury from fright alone absent an impact even though the defendant was shown to have operated a railroad negligently (shock without impact).[1] Even with intentional conduct, absent material damage, claims for emotional harm were similarly barred. “Mental pain or anxiety, the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act causes that alone. Though where a material damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the party interested.”[2] Courts had been reluctant to accept a tort for emotional harm for fear of opening a “wide door” to frivolous claims.[3]
A change first occurred in the Irish courts which repudiated the English railroad decision.[4] The idea that shock without impact would be a bar to recovery was first questioned at the Queen’s Bench in Pugh v. London etc. Railroad Co.[5] In the following year, the tort was first formally recognised in the case of Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, although it was referred to as “intentional infliction of mental shock”. Citing Pugh and the Irish courts as precedent, the Wilkinson court noted the willful nature of the act as a direct cause of the harm. Wilkinson was the basis for the later decision in Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669.[6] English courts regarded Dulieu as firmly establishing the possibility of recovery for emotional harm absent physical impact.[7]
[edit] Elements
- Defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; and
- Defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; and
- Defendant’s act is the cause of the distress; and
- Plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of defendant’s conduct.
[edit] Intentional or reckless act
The intent of the act need not be to bring about emotional distress. A reckless disregard for the likelihood of causing emotional distress is sufficient.[citation needed] For example, if a defendant refused to inform a plaintiff of the whereabouts of the plaintiff’s child for several years, though that defendant knew where the child was the entire time, the defendant could be held liable for IIED even though the defendant had no intent to cause distress to the plaintiff.
[edit] Extreme and outrageous conduct
The conduct must be heinous and beyond the standards of civilized decency or utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Whether the conduct is illegal does not determine whether it meets this standard. IIED is also known as the tort of “outrage,” due to a classic formulation of the standard: the conduct must be such that it would cause a reasonable person to exclaim “Outrageous!” in response.
Some general factors that will persuade that the conduct was extreme and outrageous (1) there was a pattern of conduct, not just an isolated incident; (2) the plaintiff was vulnerable and the defendant knew it; (3) the defendant was in a position of power; (4) racial epithets were used; and (5) the defendant owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty.[8][9]
[edit] In public
Many jurisdictions, including Arkansas and New York, require the element that the incident complained of must have taken place in public.[citation needed]
This is consistent with other Dignitary Torts, which all require some public space, publicity, or publication.[citation needed]
[edit] Causation
The actions of the defendant must have actually caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress.[9]
[edit] Plaintiff must actually suffer emotional distress
The emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs must be “severe.” This standard is quantified by the intensity, duration, and any physical manifestations of the distress. A lack of productivity or depression documented by professional psychiatrists is typically required here, although acquaintances’ testimony about a change in behavior could be persuasive.
An example of an act which might form the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress would be sending a letter to an individual falsely informing the person that a close family member had been killed in an accident.
[edit] Pleading practices
In civil procedure systems (such as in the United States) that allow plaintiffs to plead multiple alternative theories that may overlap or even contradict each other, a plaintiff will usually bring an action for both intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). This is just in case the plaintiff later discovers that it is impossible to prove at trial the necessary mens rea of intent; even then, the jury may still be able to rule for them on the NIED claim.
There are some reported cases in which a plaintiff will bring only a NIED claim even though a reasonable neutral observer could conclude that the defendant’s behavior was probably intentional. This is usually because the defendant may have some kind of insurance coverage (like homeowners’ insurance or automobile liability insurance). As a matter of public policy, insurers are barred from covering intentional torts like IIED, but may be liable for NIED committed by their policyholders, and therefore are targeted indirectly in this fashion as deep pockets.
[edit] Hostility towards IIED claims
Courts in most jurisdictions take a decidedly unfavorable stance towards IIED claims. It is felt that they are generally frivolous claims for non-quantifiable harm, and often are appended to other more substantive claims merely as an afterthought. Meeting the element of conduct that is so outrageous as to be beyond the bounds of civilized society is extremely difficult, and consequently most claims fail.
The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has stated that “Indeed, of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered by this Court, every one has failed because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.” Howell v. New York Post.[10]
[edit] First Amendment considerations
The U.S. Supreme Court case Hustler v. Falwell involved an IIED claim brought by the evangelist Jerry Falwell against the publisher of Hustler Magazine for a parody ad that described Falwell as having lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse. The Court ruled that the First Amendment protected such parodies of public figures from civil liability.[11]
[edit] References
- ^ In English law, see Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888) 13 AC 222 woman barred from recovery due to shock despite suffering a miscarriage, along similar grounds decided in the same month in New York see Lehman v. Brooklyn City Railroad Co. 47 Hun (NY) 355 (1888)
- ^ Lord Wensleydale, Lynch v. Knight (1861) 9 HLC 577 at 598; 11 ER 854, where a married woman unsuccessful sought redress for “slanderous imputation of unchastity”
- ^ Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co. 151 NY 107 (1896)
- ^ see Bell v. Great Northern Railway of Ireland (1895) 26 LR (Ir) 428; also citing an unreported decision in Byrne v. Great Southern and Western R. Co. of Ireland
- ^ [1896] 2 QB 248
- ^ note: material elements in Dulieu were substantially similar to Coultas
- ^ Archibald H. Throckmorton Damages for Fright, Harvard Law Review 24 Harv L. Rev. 260 (1921)
- ^ Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998).
- ^ a b GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).
- ^ (internal citations omitted) Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993).
- ^ Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
